Key Moments
- Europe’s share of LNG imports sourced from the United States rose to 63% in the first quarter, and is projected to reach roughly two-thirds in 2026.
- IEEFA projects Europe could obtain up to 80% of its LNG from U.S. suppliers by 2028 or 2029 as Middle East disruptions tighten the global market.
- Despite plans to ban new long-term Russian LNG contracts from January 2027, Russian LNG shipments to Europe increased 16% year-on-year in the first quarter.
Growing Reliance on U.S. LNG
Europe’s rapid move away from Russian pipeline gas has opened up a new exposure: a mounting reliance on liquefied natural gas shipped from the United States, amplified by supply disruptions linked to conflict in the Middle East.
New data from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) show that by 2026, about two-thirds of Europe’s LNG imports are expected to originate from the United States. That compares with 63% in the first quarter and 57% a year earlier. Since 2021, imports of U.S. LNG into Europe have more than tripled after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered an urgent push to replace lost pipeline flows.
IEEFA’s projections indicate this exposure could intensify. The organization estimates that by 2028 or 2029, as much as 80% of Europe’s LNG could be supplied by the United States, highlighting how one form of geopolitical dependency is being exchanged for another.
“Europe’s shift from pipeline gas to LNG was meant to provide security of supply and diversification,” said Ana Maria Jaller-Makarewicz, lead energy analyst at IEEFA. “Yet disruptions caused by the war in the Middle East and an overreliance on U.S. LNG show that Europe’s plan has failed on both counts.”
Middle East Disruptions Tighten Global LNG Balance
Recent turbulence in the Middle East has intensified Europe’s vulnerability. Disruptions stemming from conflict in the region and threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have affected Qatari LNG exports and disrupted around 20% of global LNG supply. As a result, European buyers have increasingly turned to Atlantic Basin volumes, with U.S. cargoes playing a central role.
This shift has important implications for maritime markets. The pattern favors longer transatlantic voyages, constraints on LNG tanker availability, and persistent strength in demand for LNG carriers as Europe locks in a model that is more heavily dependent on seaborne supply.
Russian LNG: Political Exit, Commercial Expansion
Even as European policymakers move to reduce exposure to Russian gas – including plans to prohibit long-term Russian LNG contracts from January 2027 – flows of Russian LNG into Europe have been moving in the opposite direction.
In the first quarter, Russian LNG deliveries to Europe rose 16% compared with the same period a year earlier, reaching a record high for that time of year. This lifted Russia to the position of Europe’s second-largest LNG supplier, with a 13% share of the market.
France at the Center of the Contradiction
France has emerged as the most visible example of this disconnect between policy signals and trade flows. In the first quarter, France imported more Russian LNG than any other European country. Russian cargoes accounted for 35% of France’s total LNG intake and represented 41% of all Russian LNG imported into Europe. Its purchases in January reached a new monthly record.
| Supplier / Metric | Detail |
|---|---|
| U.S. share of Europe’s LNG imports (1Q) | 63% |
| U.S. share of Europe’s LNG imports (a year earlier) | 57% |
| Projected U.S. share of Europe’s LNG imports (2026) | Roughly two-thirds |
| Forecast U.S. share of Europe’s LNG imports (2028-2029) | Up to 80% |
| Share of global LNG disrupted by Middle East conflict | Around 20% |
| Russian share of Europe’s LNG market (1Q) | 13% |
| Change in Russian LNG imports to Europe (year-on-year, 1Q) | +16% |
| Russian share of France’s LNG imports (1Q) | 35% |
| France’s share of Europe’s Russian LNG imports (1Q) | 41% |
A Paradox in Europe’s Gas Strategy
The outcome is an increasingly contradictory landscape. Europe is politically committed to cutting ties with Russian energy, yet commercially it has become more dependent on LNG cargoes originating from both the United States and Russia.
This is unfolding while Europe’s overall gas demand is projected to decline by 14% by 2030. At the same time, the continent is planning a 32% increase in LNG regasification capacity, raising the prospect that port infrastructure and floating import terminals could face underutilization.
As Jaller-Makarewicz put it: “As long as European countries choose to rely on gas, they must accept the geopolitical risks that come with it.”





